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The Future of China: Three 
Scenarios 
by Murray Weidenbaum 
As we begin to think about the 21st century, we 
are entering a time of fundamental global change. 
The most dramatic shift will be the movement of 
China to the status of great power. Yet, the only 
specific forecast for the future of China that we can 
make with confidence is that a straight-line extrapo-
lation is most unlikely to occur. China will not 
continue to grow at double digit rates for the com-
ing decade. Nor is the rest of Southeast Asia going 
to grow at the 8 percent that has been registered for 
the past decade and more. Nor is everything going 
to go smoothly. 
The uncertainties facing China and Southeast 
Asia generally are profound and numerous. What 
follows the death of Deng Xiaoping? Will the Hong 
Kong integration go well? Will Beijing and Taipei 
develop a modus vivendi, rather than continue to 
move from crisis to crisis? Will Indonesia experi-
ence political and economic turbulences after 
Suharto passes from the scene? What about energy 
shortages, environmental problems, corruption, pi-
racy, et al.? Surely, there is no shortage of ques-
tions and policy problems to be faced. 
In a sense, we all have learned humility from 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Every China ex-
pert now begins the forecast with a caveat: None of 
us really knows what will happen after Deng goes 
(assuming he hasn't already). The sensible approach 
is to develop several scenarios and examine their 
implications. 
Murray Weidenbaum is chairman of the Center for the 
Study of American Business and Mallinckrodt Distin-
guished University Professor at Washington University 
in St. Louis. This article draws heavily from Murray 
Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The Bamboo Network 
(New York: Free Press, 1996). 
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Growth Scenario Showing 
China Catching Up 
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Note: Because of considerable difficulty in estimating 
China's GDP, the World Bank's purchasing power 
parity (PPP) is averaged with conventional GDP 
based upon international exchange rates to forecast 
China's growth scenario. 
Source: Murray Weidenbaum and Samuel Hughes, The 
Bamboo Network (New York: The Free Press, 
1996), p. 226. 
Scenario #1: Successful Transition to 
a Market Economy 
This is the trouble-free scenario, at least com-
pared to the others. In scenario #1, China com-
pletes the transition to a market-based, privately run 
economy. Within the coming decade, it overtakes 
Japan as the largest economy of Asia (see Figure 
1). This assumes, of course, that, after Deng's 
death, economic reformers maintain policy control. 
Also, Hong Kong is successfully incorporated into 
the People's Republic of China and closer economic 
and cultural ties are developed with Taiwan. Qui-
etly, Chinese and Thiwanese companies are already 
2 
joining forces to explore for oil in the South China 
Sea. A Taiwan-based firm is investing in the project 
through its Panamanian subsidiary to skirt the Taipei 
ban on direct investment in China. In scenario #1, 
Western investment replaces the overseas Chinese 
family enterprises (the bamboo network) as the ma-
jor source of capital for China's continued economic 
expansion. 
As was the case in Korea and Taiwan, greater 
wealth and prosperity lead to political reform. In 
essence, China will be following the Asian model 
of development. In the West, priority is given to 
personal freedom and political liberties. The Asian 
development process works the other way. The ex-
pansion of economic freedom initially occurs at a 
time of continued political repression. Yet, the rise 
of a middle class and of private enterprise disperses 
power in the society. As a result, pressures arise 
for greater political freedom. Witness Taiwan re-
cently held its first free presidential election. 
Some serious complications are dealt with suc-
cessfully by the Chinese authorities. Economic 
growth continues, but at a more sustainable 8 per-
cent. However, inflationary pressures heat up. 
Nevertheless, the central bank learns to deal with 
these matters and is granted the power to take deci-
sive action. 
The strong military establishment cooperates with 
the civilian authorities in this scenario. The People's 
Liberation Army (PLA) shares in the general pros-
perity through its substantial business holdings. 
Inefficient state-owned firms are reorganized. 
Their deficits no longer sop up domestic investment 
capital. The government in its dealings with these 
perennial deficit operations takes a sink or swim 
attitude. As a result, some sink, but some swim 
also. A modern legal system is gradually con-
structed, an important step in attracting large 
amounts of investment capital from the West. Prop-
erty rights, accounting conventions, and commer-
cial banking are established. Some complications 
are going to be very difficult to deal with, even in 
the most optimistic circumstances. Energy short-
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ages will grow with economic expansion. 
All of the responses involve serious side effects. 
One solution is to exploit potentials of the South 
China Sea. However, such action would stir up 
problems with Malaysia, Philippines, Vietnam, and 
Taiwan because China claims areas now held by or 
also claimed by one or more of those smaller South-
east Asian nations. The possibility of military con-
frontation with the United States would arise. Al-
ternatively, the Tarim Basin reserves in the far west-
em part of China could be developed more inten-
sively. This approach would require building all 
sorts of expensive supporting infrastructure. Quickly 
developing the Tarim petroleum reserves also re-
quires giving western oil companies a much larger 
role, especially in awarding them more attractive 
sites now reserved for future exploration suppos-
edly by domestic firms which somehow will ac-
quire the requisite technology. 
If China can succeed, it will give the 
United States a run for its money for 
being the largest economy in the 
middle of the 2 P1 century. 
The Chinese show a marked reluctance to share 
wealth, unlike the Arab goverrunents which wel-
come British and American exploration companies. 
China's lingering fears of imperialism are very 
strong, which is understandable given the country's 
history of foreign exploitation and occupation, es-
pecially by Great Britain and Japan. 
Infrastructure shortcomings will worsen as the 
economy expands rapidly. There is limited incen-
tive for large-scale public investment. Meanwhile, 
the growth of air travel and widespread use of cel-
lular phones partially fill the gap. Simultaneously, 
envirorunental pollution will accelerate with the ris-
ing output of a growing economy. The "cleaner" 
coal reserves soon will be used up, and thus more 
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coal usage will be a dangerous response to the lack 
of an adequate petroleum supply. 
In the long run, China's continued rapid eco-
nomic expansion may be limited by envirorunental 
and resource constraints. China is already the 
world's third largest emitter of greenhouse gases. 
Generating an adequate energy supply will require 
tradeoffs with economic, social, and political ob-
jectives. Dealing with all these issues will be a 
very tall order. If China can succeed, it will give 
the United States a run for its money for being the 
largest economy in the middle of the 21st century 
(see Figure 1). However, other scenarios need to 
be considered. 
Scenario #2: Reversion to Communism 
If Scenario #1 requires everything to go right, 
Scenario #2 means everything goes wrong. In es-
sence, China remains a communist nation and the 
hard liners take control after Deng. They quickly 
limit or reverse economic reforms. Mang lui (the 
dispossessed peasants) support reversion to com-
munism which represents an abrupt shift from the 
initial strong support of farmers for Deng's eco-
nomic liberalization. The existing special economic 
zones would remain, but their rights and privileges 
would be restricted. No new zones would be cre-
ated. The special privileges now accorded to for-
eign investment (which have been cut back in the 
past year) would be ended. 
The rich and vibrant economy of Hong Kong 
would be squeezed for two reasons. First, Shang-
hai - whose goverrunent is dominated by national 
goverrunent loyalists - would seize the opportunity 
to regain its supremacy among the cities of China. 
Second, the power structure in Beijing would try to 
take over at least a portion of Hong Kong's great 
wealth. Greed surely is still a motivating factor. 
Under the second scenario, the power of the 
military increases, especially given the almost uni-
versal desire to maintain order (to avoid luan, chaos). 
A stronger military is likely to result in more saber-
rattling in the South China Sea as well as serious 
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threats to Taiwan. Surely, the American desire for a 
peaceful settlement of the relationship between the 
mainland and Thiwan is a highly desirable objective. 
However, the touchiness of the People's Republic of 
China on this issue is understandable when viewed 
in a historical context. When I expressed this view 
at a meeting with Chinese government officials, they 
responded with a pointed question; did not the United 
States use military force when the South attempted 
to secede in the 1860s? 
If the second scenario becomes a reality, China's 
economy likely will nose-dive. Much of the bam-
boo network investment would move to Southeast 
Asia, Australia, and the West. New Western in-
vestment would virtually cease except for the funds 
that would be necessary to protect existing invest-
ments. 
In this eventuality, India pushes to replace China 
as Asia's leading growth area. That huge nation 
would bring special assets to the competition: wide-
spread use of the English language and establish-
ment of a modem legal system (patterned after the 
British). However, India is also hobbled by a cum-
bersome bureaucracy which is a major inhibitor to 
investment, entrepreneurship, and innovation. 
At the same time, Singapore, Malaysia, and 
Indonesia would try to develop a new "growth tri-
angle" modeled after the successful "growth tri-
angle" of Taiwan, Hong Kong, and coastal China. 
Despite the political differences, the economic uni-
fication of that area has been very successful. A 
substantial amount of cross trade and cross invest-
ment occurs. All in all, the second scenario de-
scribes a very unstable situation. Likely, it would 
lead to a very different scenario. 
Scenario #3: 
Instability and Fragmentation 
China's situation could go from bad to worse. 
In the broad sweep of that nation's history, China 
has not always been united. What we would call 
the "outer empire" (which excludes the Han or eth-
nic Chinese) could separate and fragment. Pos-
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sible candidates for splitting up include the Mos-
lem areas of Mongolia and Xinjiang (the latter con-
taining the vital oil reserves in the Tarim Basin), 
the Buddhist area of Tibet, and the Japanese-ori-
ented area of Manchuria. If such an extreme even-
tuality would occur, it would leave the Han Chinese 
in control of industrialized Southern and Eastern 
regions - notably Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Guangdong - as well as much of agricultural cen-
tral China. China would become a major source of 
political and military instability in Asia, but no 
longer a major economic competitor. One scary 
prospect is the possibility of refugees by the mil-
lions fleeing to adjacent countries. 
What Is Likely to Occur? 
It is not likely that any of the three scenarios 
will occur as spelled out here. A "Chinese menu" 
could occur (some from column A and some from 
column B), avoiding an extreme outcome. There-
sult could be a shifting combination of economic 
openness, socialist ideology, and local independence. 
As described by one analyst, the following rela-
tionship would develop: "Beijing will pretend to 
rule the provinces, and the provinces will pretend 
to be ruled by Beijing." In any event, neither policy 
nor practice will move in a straight line - nor to a 
polar alternative. 
A parallel to the United States comes to mind. 
The competition between Jefferson and Hamilton 
- especially between centralized control and de-
centralized operations - endures to this day. From 
time to time, we go to bigger government, then to 
smaller government, and then reverse field again. 
Similarly, shifts occur in federalism, with states 
gaining ascendancy at times, later local governments 
assuming more responsibility, and often followed 
by the role of the federal government rising rapidly. 
The United States is a mixed economy, with 
substantial government intervention in the economy, 
but in a very uneven manner. Consider the differ-
ent positions of the defense industry, the automo-
tive industry, and the chemical industry. In the de-
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fense industry, the government carefully determines 
the product to be sold and the way it is manufac-
tured. In the auto industry, the government strongly 
influences the nature of the final product, but not 
the production or marketing process. In the chemi-
cal industry, government strongly influences manu-
facturing and distribution, and only occasionally the 
specific nature of the product. Why would we ex-
pect China to be very different? 
The Outlook 
In any eventuality, China is becoming a great 
power with all sorts of foibles and shortcomings. 
We have to learn to accept that, as we do in the case 
of other superpowers. It is dangerous for our for-
eign policy to be driven by narrow domestic forces . 
Some of the issues they raise are quite self-serving, 
when carefully examined. Yes, the Chinese use 
prison labor. But so do we. In our case, it is called 
the Federal Prisons Industry, a bureau in the U.S. 
Department of Justice. 
Yes, Asian companies pay much lower wages 
than American workers receive. But like us, they 
pay the wage prevailing in the region where the 
workers perform. Those that advocate U.S. firms 
paying U.S. wage rates in Asia are economically 
illiterate or playing games - the old protectionist 
game. On reflection, there is nothing sinful or even 
surprising when employers pay market wages, rather 
than viewing their role as an eleemosynary institu-
tion. 
The use of child labor is a more difficult issue. 
It helps to remember that, at the comparable stage 
of development, we used child labor. In the case of 
poor Asian countries today, sadly, brothels (not idyl-
lic homes) are often the alternative to low wage fac-
tories. But as our economy developed, we shifted 
away from the widespread use of child labor. It is 
useful to recall that we did not change because of 
foreign pressure. 
On the positive side, the United States has no 
basic conflicts with China. There surely is no ter-
ritorial dispute, the traditional basis for war. More 
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fundamentally, there is little negative history be-
tween the two nations. This is quite unlike the Japa-
nese (the memories of the World War II occupation 
are still vivid among the older generation) and the 
British. In the latter case, the two opium wars a 
century ago may be dim in the memories of West-
erners. But the Chinese clearly recall that period 
of blatant imperialism where the English used their 
military might to force the Chinese to buy opium 
from British India. 
China is the most exciting business 
opportunity in the global economy. 
In contrast , there are many potential 
complementarities between the two nations. China 
possesses a great labor supply and potential mar-
kets, while the United States has technology, mar-
keting capability, and organizational know-how. 
Several American business successes in China are 
quite stunning. For example, Procter & Gamble is 
the largest daily-use consumer-products company, 
domestic or foreign , operating in China. P & G's 
Rejoice shampoo generates sales in Guangdong prov-
ince only second to the level attained in the United 
States. 
Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore (the distinguished 
senior minister) said it well, albeit melodramati-
cally: "The size of China's displacement of the 
world balance is such that the world must find a 
new balance . . . This is the biggest player in the 
history of man." The realignment of world power 
relationships, in retrospect, may be akin to the ex-
perience of the United States in breaking into the 
mid-19th century club of advanced industrialized 
nations, then monopolized by Europe. 
China is the mosr exciting business opportunity 
in the global economy. In late 1994, the Gallup 
Organization surveyed a sample of Chinese consum-
ers across that vast nation. Keeping in mind the 
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shortcomings of statistical extrapolation, Gallup re-
ported that 95 percent have some electricity at home, 
92 percent watch television, and 70 percent read a 
newspaper. However, only 3 percent own an auto-
mobile, 4 percent have running water, 9 percent 
own a telephone, and 24 percent have cable TV. In 
terms of brand penetration, 62 percent have heard 
of Coca-Cola, 22 percent Ford, 15 percent KFC, 
and 14 percent Nike. 
No other region contains China's potent com-
bination of physical and human resources. In my 
view, it is vital for Americans to better understand 
events in that exotic part of the world and not be on 
the outside trying to look in. 
Listening to the experiences of 
Americans and other foreigners who do 
business in China, hard knocks are to 
be expected. 
Words of caution are always in order. Not all is 
sweetness and light in that relationship. Americans 
doing business in China report serious negatives, 
especially tales of corruption, both personal and 
official. More than 300,000 local government offi-
cials in the poor province of Anhui were recently 
caught siphoning or misusing public funds. Most 
were disciplined, but few were prosecuted. 
Foreign businesses are often confused as to who 
has the ultimate authority to negotiate deals in China. 
Often there are many approvals or "chops" involved. 
Some Western firms use Chinese intermediaries, 
either from the mainland or among the ethnic Chi-
nese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia, to help with 
the intricacies and special cultural nuances involved. 
Personnel connections or guanzi can help in cutting 
through the many layers of bureaucracy. 
Many U.S. companies join forces with overseas 
Chinese businesses in attempting to penetrate the 
China market. These "bamboo network" firms can 
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serve as a valuable link between East and West, 
especially in opening doors to newcomers to East 
Asian ways of doing business. 
AT&T and Lockheed from time to time have 
joined forces with the companies of Li Ka-shing of 
Hong Kong. Amoco Oil and Radisson Hotels 
partnered with the Salim Group of Indonesia. The 
insurance brokerage Alexander & Alexander entered 
into extended arrangements with the Lippa Group 
of Malaysia. KFC and 7-11 have joint ventures 
with the Charoen Pokphand Group (or CP) of Thai-
land. 
The head of the CP Group laments that U.S. 
lawyers can destroy the chemistry needed between 
partners to make a deal work, that the legalism so 
endemic in the United States often clashes with the 
Asian emphasis on personal relations. In any event, 
Wal-Mart tried to work with CP to enter China but 
wound up teaming up with enterprises in mainland 
China. On a more positive note, in 1995 Monsanto 
formed a joint 60-40 percent venture with the Jiangsu 
Chemical Pesticide Group on the mainland to make 
and market its Therminol heat-transfer fluids. 
Listening to the experiences of Americans and 
other foreigners who do business in China, hard 
knocks are to be expected. Even some of the expe-
rienced Hong Kong investors got burned in 1989 
when they opened a restaurant for tourists near 
Tiananmen Square, just a week before the shooting. 
No amount of guanzi or due diligence would have 
prevented that fiasco. In a variation on that theme, 
Gordon Y. S. Wu, the prosperous Hong Kong de-
veloper, stated on one occasion that there were more 
sharks on the land (in Hong Kong) than in Victoria 
Harbor. 
China is the prime example of my standard fore-
cast; in change, there is both threat and opportu-
nity. Infeng shui (Chinese numerology), eight is a 
lucky number. So, I leave you with my favorite 
eight letters for dealing with China: Good luck! 
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